

QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

REPORT FOR RISK ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION OF PROCESS SIMULATION STUDY

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1. Report Approval

This is a specific report for Risk assessment and Mitigation of Process Simulation Study which has to be carried out in Sterile Plant.

Prepared	Bv:
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Name	Designation	Department	Signature	Date

Checked By:

Name	Designation	Department	Signature	Date

Approved By:

Name	Designation	Department	Signature	Date



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2.0 Overview

2.1 Objective:

The Objective of this report is to adopt a systematic process for the assessment, control, communication and review of risk associated with the Process Simulation study which is to be carried out in the Sterile Plant.

2.2 Purpose and Scope:

The purpose of this report is to outline a scientific and practical approach for decision making process by applying a suitable tool of risk assessment covering all aspects of risk associated with Process Simulation study.

2.3 Risk Assessment Team:

Production Executive/Officer/Manager
 Quality control Executive/Officer/Manager
 Projects Engineer/Sr. Engineer/Manager
 Maintenance Executive/Officer/Manager
 Quality Assurance Executive/Officer/Manager

2.4 Responsibility:

S.No.	Department	Designation	Responsibility	
1.	Production	Executive/Officer/	Review of Protocol & report	
		Manager	To Provide the all relevant information that are required	
			while undergoing Risk assessment process i.e. Quantity,	
	0 11: 1	E .: /O.CC: /	Packaging etc.	
2.	Quality control	Executive/Officer/	Review of Protocol & report	
		Manager	To Provide information about the availability of	
			Analytical methods Pharmaconaic reference and finally reviewing the testing	
			Pharmacopeia reference and finally reviewing the testing procedures	
3.	Maintenance	Executive/Officer/	Review of Protocol & report	
3.	Wantenance	Manager	To assist the risk assessment team about the technical	
		1120110801	queries of facility & equipments	
4.	Projects	Executive/Officer/	Review of Protocol & report	
	-	Manager	To assist the risk assessment team about the technical	
			queries of facility & equipments & also provide	
			provisions for further reduction of associated risk with	
			facility & operations	
5.	Quality	Executive/Officer/	1	
	Assurance	Manager	To review all the Procedural controls both in-house and	
			vendor	
			To conduct audits to assess the quality management	
			system and manufacturing facility Final approval of Protocol & report By head quality	
			Final approval of Protocol & report By head quality Assurance	
			Assurance	



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3. Introduction:

Risk analysis for Process Simulation study shall be done by considering the below mentioned factors

- The Risk Impact on the Process
- The Risk impact on the Process Equipment
- The Risk impact on the Aseptic Environment of the Plant
- The Risk impact on the Product Quality & Sterility
- The Risk impact on the regulatory compliance
- The Risk impact on customer



4. Quality Risk Management Process

Risk assessment is a systematic process of organizing information to support a risk decision to be made within a risk management process. Its consists Identification of hazards and the analysis and evaluation of risks associated with exposure to those hazards Quality risk assessment begins with a well defined problem description or risk question. For risk assessment process three fundamental questions are considered

- What might go wrong?
- What is likely hood (**Occurrence**) it will go wrong?
- What are the consequences (Severity)?

• Risk Identification

Risk Identification is systematic use of information to identify hazards referring to risk questions or problem description. Information may include historical data theoretical analysis, informed opinions and concerns of stakeholders. risk Identification will be conducted by reviewing the types of events that might occur in both normal and unusual situations. This may be done by challenging the normal presumptions, and considering the possibilities of unanticipated situations. For each risk event, the underlying (root) cause should be determined that will create the potential risk occurrence.

Risk Identification addresses the "what might go wrong" question including identifying the possible consequences. This provides the basis for the further steps in quality risk management process.

Risk Analysis

Risk analysis is the estimation of risk associated with the identified hazards. It is the quantitative or qualitative process of linking the likelihood of occurrence and severity of harm and sometime the detectability of harm is also consider during estimation of risk.

Risk Evaluation

Risk Evaluation compares the identified and analyzed risk against the given risk criteria. Risk evaluation considers the strength of evidence for all three of fundamental questions.

Risks are ranked by scoring various criteria with appropriate numerical ratings, adding to scores to determine the overall score of each risk, and sorting the risks into descending order based on each score. A risk scoring threshold is established, over which risks must be mitigated using adequate design and/ or process controls that will protect the system. Those risks that fall below the threshold are either unmitigated or scheduled for later mitigation. An additional threshold or



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characteristic of risk can be used to determine the differentiation of nonmitigation versus postponed mitigation.

• Risk Control

Risk control includes decision making to reduce or mitigate risk. The purpose of risk control is to reduce the risk to the acceptance level

The risk control is done by considering the following question

- Is the risk above an acceptable level?
- What can be done to reduce or eliminate risk?
- What is appropriate balance among benefits, risks and resources?
- Are new risk is introduced as a result identified risk being controlled?

• Risk Reduction

Risk reduction focuses on processes the mitigation or avoidance of quality risk when it exceeds the acceptable level. Risk reduction includes action taken to mitigate the severity, occurrence or probability of harm and the processes that improve the detectability of harm. It is the part of risk control strategy and involves

- Engineering Control
- Procedural Control
- Manual control etc.





5. Risk Assessment for Process Simulation Study

5.1 Risk Assessment Legend

A. Severity

Ranking	Effect	Criteria	
10	Hazardous	Hazardous effect without warning. Safety related. Regulatory non-compliant.	
9	Serious	Potential hazardous effect. Able to stop without mishap. Regulatory compliance in jeopardy.	
8	Extreme	Item inoperable but safe. Customer very dissatisfied.	
7	Major	Performance severely affected but functional and safe. Customer dissatisfied.	
6	Significant	Performance degraded but operable and safe. Non-vital part inoperable. Customer experiences discomfort.	
5	Moderate	Performance moderately affected. Fault on non-vital part requires repair. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction.	
4	Minor	Minor effect on performance. Fault does not require repair. Non-vital fault always noticed. Customer experiences minor nuisance.	
3	Slight	Slight effect on performance. Non-vital fault notice most of the time Customer is slightly annoyed.	
2	Very Slight	Very slight effect on performance. Non-vital fault may be noticed. Customer is not annoyed.	
1	None	No effect.	



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B. Probability or Occurrence

Ranking	Possible Failure Rates	Probability of Failure	
10	≥1 in 2	Almost certain.	
9	1 in 3	Very high.	
8	1 in 8	High.	
7	1 in 20	Moderately high.	
6	1 in 80	Medium	
5	1 in 400	Low	
4	1 in 2,000	Slight	
3	1 in 15,000	Very slight.	
2	1 in 150,000	Remote.	
1	1 in 1,500,000	Almost impossible.	

C. Detection

Ranking	Detection	Likelihood of Detection by design control	
10	Absolute Uncertainty	No design control or design control will not detect	
		potential cause	
9	Very Remote	Very remote chance design control will detect potential	
		cause.	
8	Remote	Remote chance design control will detect potential	
		cause.	
7	Very Low	Very low chance design control will detect potential	
		cause.	
6	Low	Low chance design control will detect potential cause.	
5	Moderate	Moderate chance design control will detect potential	
		cause.	
4	Moderately High	Moderately high chance design control will detect	
		potential cause.	
3	High	High chance design control will detect potential cause.	
2	Very High	Very high chance design control will detect potential	
1	Almost Certain	Almost certain that the design control will detect	
		potential cause.	



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5.2 Risk Assessment Tool– Failure Mode effect Analysis (FMEA)

5.2.1 Risk Identification

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	Risk Identification			
1.	Lack of Personnel Hygiene & Attitude	No Formal or Practical training for aseptic Behavior Lack of knowledge about the aseptic Manufacturing Medically unfit for aseptic manufacturing Lack of facility provisions to maintain Personnel Hygiene	The environmental conditions required for the Aseptic manufacturing get disturbed which directly effects product quality Adversely effect the working Culture	Personnel Hygiene and healthy attitude for aseptic behavior is vital as it ensures the sterility of product. The Good aseptic behavior regulates and boost healthy working environment
2.	Inappropriate Man Movement	No Defined Flow for Man Movement No Procedural Control In adequate Training for the Person's No supervisory Control No display for instructions i.e. SOPs or Photographs	The environmental conditions required for the Aseptic manufacturing get disturbed which directly effects product quality	The man movements must be designed and defined so as to establish the load capacity of HVAC system to withstand limited disturbances Procedural and supervisory control is required for the maintenance of desired environmental conditions for aseptic processing



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S.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
No.	Risk Identification			
3.	Inappropriate Cleaning,	-Non Availability of standard procedure	Environment conditions	Cleaning, Sanitization or disinfection of
	Sanitization or	for cleaning, Disinfection or sanitization	not maintained for	Walls, floors & roofs by using ineffective
	Disinfection of	and procedure for cleaning or	Aseptic processing	and non validated Cleaning agents,
	Controlled Rooms (walls,	disinfectant solution Preparation	Which leads to Product	sanitizers or disinfectant in of the various
	roofs& floor), Outer	-Personnel not Trained	contamination	rooms of the appropriately designed
	surfaces of Equipment,	Inappropriate design		facility increase Viable & Non viable load
	instruments, utility lines,	- Excessive Height of roof		in the controlled area
	other pipe work and	- Inaccessible surfaces		
	Platforms	- No finishing in the roofs Walls &		Which Leads to product contamination
		Floor surfaces		
		Ineffective and non validated Cleaning		
		agents, sanitizers or disinfectant		
4.	Failure in the Raw	Non availability of Vendor Approval	Regulatory Non	The vendor approval procedure confirm
	Material Procurement,	Procedure	compliance	the minimum requirement for the
	Storage, Testing & Approval	Non Availability & Inappropriate design	Poor Material quality	consistent manufacturing, testing & supply of Quality Raw Material
	Арргочаг	of Ware house for good storage Non Availability of Approved testing	Wrong analysis results in False positive results	Availability of suitable ware housing facility prevent Product contamination & sterility
		Methods Non Availability of Procedure for Rejection & Approval of Raw material for use	for the quality of material Use of substandard material in the Batch Processing, Material Packing etc.	Approved testing method ensures exactness in the analysis and reporting results Procedure for rejection & approval of Raw material prevents the Use of substandard material in the Batch Processing, Material Packing etc.



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S.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
No.	Risk Identification			
5.	Inappropriate Raw & Packing material Handling	No Define Procedure and Provision for - material Flow - good storage conditions - Material Dispensing - Accurate weighing - Material Identification (Labeling)	 Deteriorate Material quality Deteriorate Environment conditions for storage Spillage of Material Poor Material Segregation Poor Process Performance 	Material transfer may hamper the Material quality or may hamper the environment conditions No good storage condition spoil the material quality which ultimately effects the quality of the end product No provision for Segregate Material dispensing may lead to spillage and ultimately unhygienic condition in Raw material room In accurate weighing lead to wrong inputs of material in the process which adversely effect process performance and product quality improper Identification of material may lead to cross contamination



S.	Failure Mode	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
No.	{What can go wrong}			
	Risk Identification			
6.	Drain System Failure	Non availability of GMP Model of the drains Non availability of Standard procedure for the disinfection and sanitization of the available drains Operator are not trained for the sanitization procedure of the drain	The aseptic environmental condition may be deteriorated	Non availability of GMP Model of the drains leads to improper water collection which may result into Back- Siphoning of dirty water in the washing area.
7.	Inappropriate Handling of sterilized Material during transfer, storage or usage	Non Availability of standard procedure Non Availability of Required Provision Operator Not Trained	Sterility destroyed ultimately ends into product contamination	The sterilized material if not handled properly during carrying, storage or usage Will loose its sterility and get contaminated which further contaminate surfaces, equipment or product if get in contact with it.



	Failure Mode	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification			
S.	{What can go wrong}						
No.	Risk Identification						
8.	Failure of Processing E	quipment					
8.1	Operational Error	Operator Not trained to operate the equipment	Malfunctioning of Equipment, impact Processing of product	Training Ensures Exactness of procedure to be followed for operating an equipment			
		Non availability of SOPs for the Operation of Equipment	Inappropriate handling of Equipment, Results in Poor Processing, Product contamination, Accidents, Breakdowns	Standard Operating procedure ensure correct sequence of Steps, safety measures to be taken during operating an equipment			
8.2	Dissolution Vessel, Vessel Washing Solvents	Break Down Electrical Failure	Incomplete Dissolution or Spillage Increase operation time	Breakdown of agitator, Bottom Valve Rectification of breakdown increase operation time			
	& Crystallizer	Lose of filter integrity of Vent filter & Nitrogen filter		Ruptured filter allow exposure to Product content			
		Utility failure	Poor Process Performance	Process Parameters not maintained Like temperature, Pressure etc.			
		MOC Not Compatible	Product Contamination	Because of Corrosion & undesired surface reactions with the Processing Material			
8.3	Sparkler Filter	High Pressure of Solution to	Rupture filter, Clamp gaskets Injury	Excessive Pressure from holding capacity			
	Filter train	be Filtered Lose of Filter Integrity	Product Contamination	result in breakdown Ruptured filter do not filter efficiently			
	Product Line	Loosening of Clamp holdings	Spillage, Injury, Product Lose & Product Contamination	Loose Clamp holdings can not hold pressure during material transfer & Nitrogen purging			
	Solvent Line	Breakdown	Increase operation time, Product Contamination	Breakdown rectification take time for operation completion & may product			
	Buffer Line	MOC Not Compatible	Product Contamination	Because of Corrosion & undesired surface reactions with the Processing Material			



S.	Failure Mode	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
No.	{What can go wrong}			
	Risk Identification			
8.	Failure of Processing E	Equipment		
8.4	PFE	Breakdown Electrical Failure	Ineffective Isolation & Drying of product, Increase operation	Agitator working plays important role for proper isolation and drying of Product in PFE
		Lose of filter integrity of Filter mesh	Product Lose & Product Contamination	Ruptured filter allow material to pass through it, result in product loss & product contamination
		Lose of filter integrity of Nitrogen filter	Product Contamination	Ruptured filter allow exposure to Product content during nitrogen purging
		Loosening of Clamp holdings used to fix Material & ML	Spillage, Injury, Product Lose & Product Contamination	Loose Clamp holdings can not hold pressure during material transfer & Nitrogen purging
		Utility failure	Poor Process Performance	Process Parameters not maintained Like temperature, Pressure etc.
		MOC Not Compatible	Product Contamination	Because of Corrosion & undesired surface reactions with the Processing Material
8.5	Combi & Conveyer System	Rotating Motor Failure	Ineffective Homogenization of product, Increase operation time	Motor rotation plays important role for proper Homogenization of Product in Combi
		Lose of integrity of Mesh	Ineffective homogenization	Lumps will not be removed properly
		Inappropriate Mesh Size	inappropriate Particle size	Material will not be of required Particle size if Mesh is not required size
		Breakdown Electrical Failure	Spillage & Increase operation time	Breakdown rectification take time for operation completion & may product contamination during handling the material
		Loosening of Clamp holdings	Spillage of Material	Loose Clamp holdings can not hold pressure during material transfer
		MOC Not Compatible	Product Contamination	Because of Corrosion & undesired surface reactions with the Processing Material





S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
110.	Risk Identification			
8.	Failure of Processing E	quipment		
8.6	Blender	Breakdown Electrical Failure	Blending not Homogeneous Increase operation time	Rectification of breakdown increase operation time
		Product exposure during Material charging & Unloading	Product Contamination	During charging and unloading Bin is get opened and give direct powder exposure to environment
		Accident during Rotation	Injury	During rotation operator may come under the area of blender movement
		Loosening of Clamp holdings to Powder win	Spillage, Injury, Product Lose & Product Contamination	Loose Clamp holdings can not hold pressure during material transfer to blender
		MOC Not Compatible	Product Contamination	Because of Corrosion & undesired surface reactions with the Processing Material



S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	Risk Identification			
9.	Failure of Environment	Monitoring Equipments		
9.1	HVAC System	Breakdown Electrical Failure	-Product Contamination -Production Loss -The Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed	Break down and electrical failure make the system Non working under such situation there is greater chance of Viable & Non Viable load due to Air stagnation, Increased temperature & humidity etc.
		Lose of integrity of HEPA filters	Product Contamination	Ruptured HEPA filter of HVAC System allow the particles both viable and Non Viable to pass through them
		Disturbed Differential Pressure	Product Contamination	The disturbed Air balancing can not maintain required differential Pressure for different area ,because of which Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed which leads to product contamination
		Improper Cleaning of Pre & microbe Filters	Product Contamination	The improper cleaning of filters is the source of microbial growth & particle generation in the processing area
		Cleaning of Return Risers	Product Contamination	The improper cleaning of filters lead to stagnation of air & also source of microbial growth in the processing area



S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	Risk Identification			
9.	Failure of Environment	Monitoring Equipments		
9.2	Dynamic Pass Boxes	Breakdown Electrical Failure	Product Contamination -Production Loss -The Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed	Break down and electrical failure make the system Non working under such situation there is greater chance of microbial load due to Improper segregation of Environmental conditions of different class Area during Material Transfer
		Lose of integrity of HEPA filters	Product Contamination	Ruptured HEPA filter allow the particles to pass through them due to ineffective filtration
		Disturbed Differential Pressure	Product Contamination	The disturbed Air balancing can not maintain required differential Pressure for different area ,because of which air can be flushed in from lower class area to Dynamic Pass Boxes and finally into Aseptic Processing area during material transfer
		Improper Cleaning of Pre Filters	Product Contamination	The improper cleaning of filters is the source of microbial growth in the processing area
		Improper Door Closing or Opening	Product Contamination	Improper working of doors lead to disturbed pressure gradient Leads to microbial contamination In aseptic area
		Interlock for Door opening not activated or working	Product Contamination	Both the doors get opened simultaneously and result in contamination





S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	Risk Identification			
9.	Failure of Environment M	Ionitoring Equipments		
9.3	Laminar Air Flow Units	Breakdown Electrical Failure	Product Contamination -Production Loss -The Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed	Break down and electrical failure make the system Non working under such situation there is greater chance of microbial load to effect sterility of material or Product
		Lose of integrity of HEPA filters	Product Contamination	Ruptured HEPA filter allow the particles to pass through them without filtration
		Disturbed Differential Pressure	Product Contamination Sterile Material contamination	The disturbed Air balancing can not maintain required differential Pressure for different area ,because of which air can be flushed in from lower class area to Higher class area for working
		Improper Cleaning of Pre Filters	Product Contamination	The improper cleaning of filters is the source of microbial growth & Non viable particles in the processing area



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S.	Failure Mode	Potential cause of Failure	What are the	Justification
No.	{What can go wrong}		Consequences	Justification
110.	Risk Identification		Consequences	
10.		For Sterilization & De pyrogenation	nn .	
10.	Steam Heat Sterilizer		-Production Loss	Dreak days and alastrical failure make the system
	& Dry Heat Sterilizer	Electrical Failure	-Production Loss -Increase operation time	Break down and electrical failure make the system Non working under such situation Production will be stopped & rectification increase the operation time
		Non availability of Utility at required parameters Like Nitrogen, Compressed air, Pure Steam etc	Production Loss -Increase operation time	Sterilization cycle cannot be carried out in absence of required utility
		Instrument Malfunctioning	Product Contamination Material destruction	Monitoring instruments for temperature, pressure are not giving the actual value hence cannot be controlled & monitored exactly to requirements
		PLC Malfunctioning	Production Loss Product Contamination Material destruction	Sterilization cannot be achieved without the functioning of designed control i.e. PLC
		Inappropriate Load for sterilization	Inefficient Sterilization	The equipment works efficiently for a specific load.
		Non availability of validated standard Procedure of Sterilization	Inappropriate handling of Equipment, Results in Poor Processing, Product, contamination, Accidents, Breakdowns	Standard Operating procedure ensure correct sequence of Steps, safety measures to be taken during operating an equipment
		Operator Not trained	Malfunctioning of Equipment, Adverse impact on Processing & Safety	Training Ensures Exactness of procedure to be followed for operating an equipment



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S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	Risk Identification			
10.	Failure of Equipment	For Sterilization & De pyrogenation	on	
	Steam Heat Sterilizer & Dry Heat	Lose of integrity of HEPA filters (DHS)	Material contamination	Allow the passage of unfiltered air in the chamber of DHS
	Sterilizer	Alarms & Interlocks Not working	Material contamination &Safety break	Alarms & Interlocks are designed for the safety of Man Material & Machine
		MOC Not Compatible	Product Contamination Deterioration of Components, Garments & other Accessories	Because of Corrosion & undesired surface reactions with the Processing Material



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	Risk Identification			
11.	Failure of Simulati	on Study		
11.1	The Wrong Selection of growth supporting media	Inadequate Knowledge of the person Performing selection for medium nutrient	Failure of Process simulation study	The Media may not support vital microbial growth required for detection in Process simulation study
		Regulatory guidelines not followed	Deterioration of Environment conditions in Aseptic Processing Area	The Process Simulation study involves huge volumes of growth supporting media which may cause the contamination of all the critical area walls / roof / ducts, thereby making these contact surface prone to support microbial growth
			Poor Performance of Process Equipment	The Viscosity and flow ability of the nutrient media will effect the motor performance and the cleaning and processing parameters
			The Non compatibility of the Nutrient media with the equipment surface	This may lead to Corrosion and ultimately product contamination



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	Risk Identification			
11.	Failure of Simulati	ion Study		
11.2	Wrong Process design for Simulation Study	The Person is not qualified or trained for designing the Process for Simulation study	Wrong designing of Process for simulation study	Unqualified & untrained person do not understand the Process requirement for simulation study
		The Process matrix may not cover all the products	The simulation study do not represent all the products of the plant	The simulation study must be representative of all the products by considering all extremities of process parameters like
		The Process Parameters are not decided as per Process package Like concentration, time temperature etc.	F	concentration, holding time, Non sterile load on the filters, process flow etc.
		The Process manipulations are not studied and evaluated		
		The worst case scenario is not appropriately decided	Irrational base leads to failure of the simulation study & regulatory non compliance	The rational behind the simulation study is to run a representative process at worst case scenario to accomplish the capability of the facility to produce different sterile products
		Incorporation of process step, having inhibitory action on the Microbial growth like use of solvents, acids, alkalis, High/low temperature, High agitation etc	The inappropriate assessment of microbial load Objective of simulation study not fulfilled	The microbial growth inhibition minimize the microbial load on the aseptic process which is selected for simulation study and ultimately do not give factual information about the process, equipment and the whole facility for its qualification for sterile manufacturing



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S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	wrong}			
4.4	Risk Identification	G. I		
11.	Failure of Simulation	on Study	I m	
11.3	Wrong Calculation of Quantity of growth supporting Media for the Process simulation study	The complete details of total qty. of Non sterile Raw material which will give complete load on the Filter train may not be calculated	The objective of simulation study to ensure capability of filter train to withstand required non sterile load will not be achieved	Exact Quantity of Non sterile is very important to assess the capability of filter train. The filter train helps to reduce the bio burden to the acceptable level for sterilization if qty. is not assessed properly the results will not give factual information's.
11.4	Wrong Calculation of Holding Time in the Equipment	The total time taken for the processing in a particular equipment is not ascertain correctly	The equipment performance to carry out aseptic processing for the highest occupancy time will not be established and confirmed	The challenging of process is required for the highest occupancy time to get the capability of the equipment for aseptic processing for longer duration.
11.5	Wrong agitation Time, Temperature & Pressure	Process is not studied for agitation requirement so as prevent microbial inhibition	The excessive & high agitation may give inhibitory action on the microbial growth	The well studied & appropriate agitation is required to ensure proper growth of microbes in the growth supporting media for challenging the process in its true sense.
		Temperature & Pressure requirements of process not studied or maintained	Poor Performance of Process Hamper Product Quality	Observing Process Parameters are vital for getting the desired output & quality of the Product .



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S.	Failure Mode	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
No.	{What can go wrong}		What are the consequences	Justification
1,00	Risk Identification			
11.	Failure of Simulation	Study		
11.6	In process Sampling	Untrained & Unqualified	Wrong analytical results	
	& Final Sampling	person performing sampling		
		Non Availability of SOPs for	Un cleaned tools may increase the bio	
		cleaning & up keep of burden in the sample		
		sampling tools	Result in wrong analytical results for	
			microbial load	The trained ,qualified person &
		Standard operating procedure may not be in place	Different procedure will be used for sampling each time	The same sampling procedure, time
		Sampling time for in process may not be studied or	Sampling time variation may lead to different duration of product exposure	and frequency for sampling will provided a uniform pattern for
		Sampling frequency for in process may not be studied or established	Sampling frequency variation may lead to different duration of product exposure and different pattern for challenge study	challenge study
11.7	Testing Failure	-Non Availability of Standard testing method for sterility testing -Non Availability of Validated Analytical Method -Analyst Not trained -Expired Reagents	-Wrong Analysis -False positive results -Regulatory non compliance	-The validated analytical method and standard testing procedure ensure correct sequence of testing -Training Ensures Exactness of procedure to be followed for analysis -Expired reagents gives poor performance of testing method
		Poor membrane filter performance	-Non Representative Sampling -Faulty analytical results	If membrane used for filtration can not filter the solution efficiently then membrane sample to ascertain Microbial load in the solution gives false positive results



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Justification
	Risk Identification			
12.	Process Manipulations			
12.1	Disturbance of aseptic environment in the crystallizer because of seeding	Operator error	The Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed	The product exposure must be acceptable under grade A otherwise it may hamper the product quality and sterility
12.2	Product exposure during transfer of material from PFE to Combi through Conveyer	Malfunctioning of Clamp used to fix Bellow Operator Error		
12.3	Product exposure during Blending &Packing	Malfunctioning of Clamp used to fix Bellow Operator Error		
12.4	Cleaning & sanitization after the completion of each batch	-In appropriate Manual fixation of Hose pipes for cleaning -Spillage during Transfer of spent solution to CIP tank -Mishandling during Dismantling & fixation of components & accessories during cleaning		The spillage, Drain & mishandling of cleaning medium, spent solution in the controlled area will increase the chance of microbial growth



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S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Justification	
	Risk Identification			
13.	Challenge Design for Proc	cess simulation study		
13.1	Failure to simulate Process for 24 hrs	All the shifts may not be considered for Simulation study	Process simulation study will not be represent all the times for aseptic manufacturing	Process is required to simulate in all the three shifts so as to establish its capability for 24 hrs
13.2	Aseptic Environment deterioration on employment of additional Man power in case of requirement	Inefficiency of HAVC system to withstand the disturbance by employing additional person for aseptic area manufacturing	Product contamination	Addition disturbance because of additional manpower in aseptic manufacturing area increase the load
13.3	Aseptic Environment deterioration on performing minor maintenance work in the aseptic manufacturing area	Inefficiency of HVAC system to withstand the disturbance by carrying out minor maintenance work in the aseptic manufacturing area	Product contamination	Addition disturbance due to maintenance work in aseptic manufacturing area increase the load
13.4	Aseptic Environment deterioration on Power failure	Non Working of HVAC System	Product contamination	Stagnant air increase the load of viable & Non Viable counts in aseptic manufacturing area



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

REPORT FOR RISK ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION OF PROCESS SIMULATION STUDY

5.2.2 Risk Analysis

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Probability	Detection		Existing Design Control
	Risk Analysis			(S)	(P)	` /	RPN=S x P x D Risk valuation	
1.	Lack of Personnel Hygiene & Attitude	No Formal or Practical training for aseptic manufacturing Lack of knowledge about the aseptic Manufacturing Medically unfit for aseptic manufacturing Lack of facility provisions to maintain Personnel Hygiene	The environmental conditions required for the Aseptic manufacturing get disturbed which directly effects product quality Adversely effect the working Culture	9	8		=9 x 8 x 7=504	Training for Personnel Hygiene for all persons Personnel Monitoring Once a day Training on Positive attitude for working
2.	No Defined Man Movement Procedures	No Defined Flow for Man Movement No Procedural Control In adequate Training for the Person's No supervisory Control No display for instructions i.e. SOPs or Photographs	The environmental conditions required for the Aseptic manufacturing get disturbed which directly effects product quality	9	5	7	=9 x 5 x 7=315	Approved Layouts for Man movement Training on SOP for Exit & exit , Do's & Don'ts in sterile plant One shift in charge per shift



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Probability	Detection		Existing Design Control
	Dick Analysis			(S)	(P)	` ′	RPN=S x P x D Pick Evaluation	
3.	Risk Analysis Inappropriate Cleaning, Sanitization or Disinfection of Controlled Rooms (walls, roofs& floor), Outer surfaces of Equipment, instruments, utility lines, other pipe work and Platforms	-Non Availability of standard procedure for cleaning, Disinfection or sanitization and procedure for cleaning or disinfectant solution Preparation -Personnel not Trained Inappropriate design - Excessive Height of roof - Inaccessible surfaces - No finishing in the roofs Walls & Floor surfaces Ineffective and non	Environment conditions not maintained for Aseptic processing Which leads to Product contamination	8	8		=8 x 8 x 7=448	Approved SOPs Training for the Persons Validated & Effective Cleaning agents, sanitizers or disinfectant SOP for Building Management verification is done half yearly
		validated Cleaning agents, sanitizers or disinfectant						



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(d) Probability	(E) Detection	Risk Priority Number	Existing Design Control
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	
4.	Failure in the Raw Material Procurement, Storage, Testing & Approval	Non availability of Vendor Approval Procedure Non Availability & Inappropriate design of Ware house for good storage Non Availability of Approved testing Methods Non Availability of Procedure for Rejection & Approval of Raw material for use	Regulatory Non compliance Poor Material quality Wrong analysis results in False positive results for the quality of material Use of substandard material in the Batch Processing, Material Packing etc.	9	5	2	=9 x 5 x 2=90	Availability of Vendor Approval Procedure Availability & Inappropriate design of Ware house Availability of Approved testing Methods Availability Procedure for Rejection & Approval of Raw material for use



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Pı		Risk Priority Number	Existing Design Control
	Diale Analysis			(3)	(P)	` ′	Risk Evaluation	
	Risk Analysis	,		1	ı	ı	RISK Evaluation	
5.	Inappropriate Raw & Packing material Handling	No Define Procedure and Provision for - material Flow - good storage conditions - Material Dispensing - Accurate weighing - Material Identification (Labeling)	 Deteriorate Material quality Deteriorate Environment conditions for storage Spillage of Material Poor Material Segregation Poor Process Performance 	7	7	4	=7 x 7 x 4=196	Approved Layouts for Material movement SOP for the storage of Raw & Packing Material SOP for the Dispensing of Material SOP for the operation of Weighing Balances



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	(S) Severity	Ь	(D) Detection	Risk Priority Number RPN=S x P x D	Existing Design Control
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	
6.	Drain System Failure	Non availability of GMP Model of the drains Non availability of Standard procedure for the disinfection and sanitization of the available drains Operator are not trained for the sanitization procedure of the drain	The aseptic environmental condition may be deteriorated	7	4	2	=7 x 4 x 2=56	The GMP Model of drains are provided in the Plant Standard procedure for the disinfection and sanitization of the are available for drains Operators are trained for the sanitization procedures



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(d) Probability	(D)	Risk Priority Number RPN=S x P x D	Existing Design Control
	AUSIX TITILITY SIS						Evaluation	
7.	Inappropriate Handling of sterilized Material during transfer, storage or usage	Non Availability of standard procedure Non Availability of Required Provision Operator Not Trained	Sterility destroyed ultimately ends into product contamination	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	Availability of validated standard procedure Mobile LAF for carrying Sterilized material Garment Cubicles for storage of sterilized garments Formal Training to the operator



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

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S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	X	ity	_	Risk Priority Number	
110.	(What can go wrong)			Severity	abil		Number	
				Sev	Probability	Detection		Existing Design Control
				(S)			RPN=S x P x D	
	Risk Analysis –						Risk Evaluation	
8.	Failure of Processing E	quipments						
8.1	Operational Error	Operator Not trained to	Malfunctioning of Equipment,					Availability of
		operate the equipment	impact Processing					validated standard
		N 11111 CCOD	T					procedure
		Non availability of SOPs	Inappropriate handling of	9	5	1	=9 x 5 x 4=180	
		for the Operation of	Equipment, Results in Poor	9	5	4	-9 X J X 4-100	Formal training to
		Equipment	Processing, Product					the operator for the
			contamination, Accidents,					operation of all
			Breakdowns					Processing
								equipment
8.2	Dissolution Vessel,	Break Down	Incomplete Dissolution or					SOP for Equipment
	Vessel Washing Solvents	Electrical Failure	Spillage					Operation
		I 6 6'14 ' 6	Increase operation time					SOP to check filter
	& Crystallizer	Lose of filter integrity of			0		7 0 5 200	before and after the
		Vent filter	Product Contamination	7	8	5	=7 x 8 x 5=280	batch
		Lose of filter integrity of						SS 316 L verified
		Nitrogen filter						
								during Qualification
		MOC Not Compatible						through
								certification



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity			Risk Priority Number	Existing Design Control
	Risk Analysis –						Risk Evaluation	
8.	Failure of Processi	ing Equipments					1	
8.3	-Filter train -Product Line -Solvent Line -Buffer Line	High Pressure of Solution to be Filtered Lose of filter integrity of filter Loosening of Clamp holdings MOC Not Compatible	Increase operation time, Product Contamination Rupture filter, Clamp gaskets Injury Spillage, Injury, Product Lose & Product Contamination Product Contamination	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of filtration through different filter trains SS 316 L verified during Qualification through certification



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(d) Probability	(D)	Risk Priority Number RPN=S x P x D	Existing Design Control
	Risk Analysis –						Risk Evaluation	
8.	Failure of Processi	ng Equipments						
8.4	PFE	Breakdown Electrical Failure Lose of filter integrity of Filter	Ineffective Isolation & Drying of product, Increase operation time					SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the
		Mesh Lose of filter integrity of Compressed Air filter	Product Lose & Product Contamination	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	operator for the operation of filtration through different filter trains
		Loosening of Clamp holdings used to fix Material & ML MOC Not Compatible	Spillage, Injury, Product Lose & Product Contamination Product Contamination					Supervisory control during Clamp & line assembling
								SS 316 L verified during Qualification through certification



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(d) Probability		RPN=S x P x D	
	Risk Analysis –						Risk Evaluation	
8.	Failure of Processi	ing Equipments						
8.5	Combi & Conveyer System	Lose of filter integrity of Mesh Inappropriate Mesh Size Breakdown Electrical Failure Loosening of Clamp holdings MOC Not Compatible	Ineffective Homogenization of product, Increase operation time Ineffective homogenization inappropriate Particle size Spillage & Increase operation time Spillage of Material Product Contamination	7	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of filtration through different filter trains Supervisory control during Clamp, line assembling & Mesh Fixing SS 316 L verified during Qualification through certification



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(d) Probability	(Detection		Existing Design Control
	Risk Analysis –						Risk Evaluation	
8.	Failure of Processi	ng Equipments						
8.6	Blender	Breakdown Electrical Failure Product exposure during Material charging & Unloading Accident during Rotation Loosening of Clamp holdings to Powder Bin MOC Not Compatible	Blending not Homogeneous Increase operation time Product Contamination Injury Spillage, Injury, Product Lose & Product Contamination Product Contamination	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of blender Supervisory control during Clamping the Powder Bin Railing guard as safety measure SS 316 L verified during Qualification through certification



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(d) Probability	(D) Detection		Existing Design Control
9.	Risk Analysis –	ment Monitoring Equipments					RISK Evaluation	
9.1	HVAC System	Breakdown Electrical Failure Lose of integrity of HEPA filters Accident during Rotation Disturbed Differential Pressure Improper Cleaning of Pre & microbe Filters Cleaning of Return Risers	Product Contamination -Production Loss -The Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed Product Contamination	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of HVAC SOP for DP Monitoring in each shift SOP for the cleaning of Filters & return riser Half yearly Qualification Procedure For HVAC System



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(d) Probability		RPN=S x P x l	
	Risk Analysis –						Risk Evaluation	1
9.	Failure of Environ	ment Monitoring Equipments						
9.2	Dynamic Pass	Breakdown	Product Contamination					SOP for Equipment
	Boxes	Electrical Failure	-Production Loss					Operation
		Lose of integrity of HEPA filters	-The Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed					Formal training to the operator for the operation of Dynamic Pass Boxes
		Disturbed Differential Pressure Improper Cleaning of Pre Filters	Product Contamination	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	DP Monitoring during Operation is the instructional part of SOP for operation
		Improper Door Closing or Opening Interlock for Door opening not activated or working						SOP for the cleaning of Filters Half yearly Qualification Procedure For Equipment



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(Frobability		RPN=S x P x D	Existing Design Control
•	Risk Analysis –						Risk Evaluation	
9.		ment Monitoring Equipments			I	1	T	
9.3	Laminar Air Flow Units	Breakdown Electrical Failure Lose of integrity of HEPA filters Disturbed Differential Pressure Improper Cleaning of Pre Filters	Product Contamination -Production Loss -The Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed Product Contamination Sterile Material contamination	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of Dynamic Pass Boxes DP Monitoring during Operation is the instructional part of SOP for operation SOP for the cleaning of Filters Half yearly Qualification Procedure For Equipment



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(d) Probability		Risk Priority Number RPN=S x P x D Risk Evaluation	Existing Design Control
10	Risk Analysis –							
10.		ent For Sterilization & De pyrog	enation	1			1	
	Steam Heat	Breakdown						SOP for Equipment
	Sterilizer	Electrical Failure	-Production Loss & Increase					Operation
	& Dry Heat Sterilizer	Non availability of Utility at required parameters Like compressed air, Pure Steam etc	operation time					Interlocks & alarm configuration for utility requirements
		Instrument Malfunctioning PLC Malfunctioning	Product Contamination Material destruction	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	Instrument Calibration Equipment Qualification
		Inappropriate Load for sterilization	Inefficient Sterilization Inappropriate handling of Equipment, Results in Poor					Validated Load configuration
		Non availability of validated standard Procedure of Sterilization	Processing, Product, contamination, Accidents, Breakdowns					SOP for sterilization process for SHS & DHS



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	(A) Probability		RPN=S x P x 1	
10.	Risk Analysis – Failure of Equipm	ent For Sterilization & De pyrog	renation				Risk Evaluation	1
	Steam Heat Sterilizer & Dry Heat Sterilizer	Operator Not trained Lose of integrity of HEPA filters (DHS) Alarms & Interlocks Not working MOC Not Compatible	Malfunctioning of Equipment, Adverse impact on Processing Material contamination Material contamination &Safety break Product Contamination Deterioration of Components, Garments & other Accessories	9	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=180	Formal & Practical training to the operator for the operation of SHS & DHS DP Monitoring during Operation is the instructional part of SOP for operation SOP for the cleaning of Filters Verification of Alarms & Interlocks Is the part of Qualification



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	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences		Probability		Number	Existing
	wrong			(S)	(P)	(D)	$\mathbf{RPN} = \mathbf{S} \times \mathbf{P} \times \mathbf{D}$	Design Control
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	1
	Failure of Simulati	on Study						
11.1	The Wrong Selection of growth supporting media	Inadequate Knowledge of the person Performing selection for medium nutrient Regulatory guidelines not followed	- Failure of Media Fill study - Non Compliance to regulatory -Deterioration of Environment conditions in Aseptic Processing Area -Poor Performance of Process Equipment -The Non compatibility of the Nutrient media with the equipment surface Non Compliance to Regulatory	7	4	3	=7 x 4 x 3=84	Formal training for media fill selection Criteria SS 316 L is the MOC of Different Processing Equipment which is compatible to Lactose The MOC is verified During qualification of Equipments Referred Guidance must be mentioned in the protocol Approval Procedure from Experience & Qualified Management



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode What can go	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Existing
	wrong}			(S)	(P)	(D)	$RPN=S \times P \times D$	Design Control
	Risk Analysis	1					Risk Evaluation	
11.	Failure of Sin	nulation Study						
11.2	Wrong Process design for Simulation Study	The Person is not qualified or trained for designing the Process for Simulation study The Process Simulation study may not cover all the products The Process Parameters are not decided as per Process package The Process manipulations are not studied and evaluated The worst case scenario is not appropriately decided Incorporation of process step, having inhibitory action on the Microbial growth like use of solvents, acids, alkalis, High/low temperature, High agitation etc	Wrong designing of Process for simulation study The simulation study do not represent all the products of the plant Irrational base leads to failure of the simulation study & regulatory non compliance The inappropriate assessment of microbial load Objective of simulation study not fulfilled	7	4	3	=7 x 4 x 3=84	Formal Training & relevant Experience is Assessed for Process design Product List is a the Part of Protocol Reference of process Package must be mentioned in the protocol The worst case scenario is calculated through Product Matrix Only WFI & Lactose is used, which is a supports microbial growth



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S.No.	Failure Mode	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Existing
	{What can go wrong}			(S)	(P)	(D)	$RPN = S \times P \times D$	Design Control
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	
11.	Failure of Sim	nulation Study						
11.3	Wrong Calculation of Quantity of Nutrient Medium for the simulation study	The complete details of total qty. of Non sterile Raw material which will give complete load on the Filter train may not be calculated	The objective of simulation study to ensure capability of filter train to withstand required non sterile load will not be achieved	7	6	4	=7 x 6 x 4 =168	Total quantity is considered as per batch size
11.4	Wrong Calculation of Holding Time in the Equipment	The total time taken for the processing in a particular equipment is not ascertain correctly	The equipment performance to carry out aseptic processing for the highest occupancy time will not be established and confirmed	7	6	4	=7 x 6 x 4 =168	Crystallizer time is considered for crystallizer Drying time for PFE



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity (S)	Probability (P)	Detection (D)	Risk Priority Number RPN= S x P x D	Existing Design Control
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	1
11.	Failure of Sim	nulation Study						
11.5	Wrong agitation Time, Temperature & Pressure	Process is not studied for agitation, Temperature & Pressure requirement so as to prevent microbial inhibition	The excessive & high agitation may give inhibitory action on the microbial growth Poor Performance of Process Hamper Product Quality	7	5	4	=7 x 5 x 4 =140	Minimum Agitation is Considered in crystallizer & PFE Temperature Conditions for the various Processes are considered



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Existing Design Control
				(S)	(P)	(D)	$RPN = S \times P \times D$	
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	
11.6	Failure of Simulat			1				
	Wrong In process Sampling & Final Sampling	Untrained & Unqualified person performing sampling Non Availability of SOPs for cleaning & up keep of sampling tools Standard operating procedure may not be in place Sampling time for in process may not be studied or established Sampling frequency for in process may not be studied or established	Wrong analytical results Un cleaned tools may increase the bio burden in the sample Result in wrong analytical results for microbial load Different procedure will be used for sampling each time Sampling time variation may lead to different duration of product exposure Sampling frequency variation may lead to different duration of product exposure and different pattern for challenge study	7	5	4	=7 x 5 x 4=140	Trained & Qualified persons for sampling Provision for Cleaning and Up keep of sampling tools and formal training for the same SOP for the Sampling procedure and formal training for the same Sampling time is fixed Protocols define the clear Sampling frequency



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Existing Design Control
				(S)	(P)	(D)	$RPN = S \times P \times D$	
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	
11.7	Failure of Simula	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						
	Testing Failure	Non Availability of	Wrong Analysis					
		Standard testing sterility Method	-Faulty results					Procedure for the use of
		-Non Availability of Validated Analytical Method -Analyst Not trained -Expired Reagents Poor membrane filter performance Non Calibrated Analytical Instrument	-Regulatory non compliance Non Representative Sampling -Faulty analytical results Poor Performance of Analytical Instrument	7	4	3	=7 x4x3=84	only Approved & validated Testing Procedure Qualified and trained Analyst Procedural check for the expiry date during Media Preparation & other chemical testing Pore size consideration during the selection Filter membrane Instrument Calibration Procedure



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences		Probabilit	Detection		Existing Design Control
				(S)	(P)	(D)		
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	
12.	Manual Interruptions	1	T					
12.1	Disturbance of aseptic environment in the crystallizer because of seeding	Operator error-	The Aseptic Processing	7	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=140	SOP for Seeding the material in Crystallizer Supervisory Control Separate Seeding Port
12.2	Product exposure during transfer of material from PFE to Combi through Conveyer	Malfunctioning of Clamp used to fix Bellow Operator Error	environment get disturbed	7	5	4	=7 x 5 x 4=140	SOP for the Operation Formal training for the same Supervisory Control Mobile LAF for fixing the Bellow to the conveyer
12.3	Product exposure during Blending & Packing	Malfunctioning of Clamp used to fix Bellow Operator Error		7	5	4	=7 x 5 x 4=140	SOP for the Operation Formal training for the same Supervisory Control Mobile LAF & Vertical LAF for fixing the Powder Bin to Blender & performing Packing respectively



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Probability			Existing Design Control
	Dialy Amalysis			(S)	(P)	(D)	RPN= S x P x D Risk Evaluation	
10	Risk Analysis						RISK Evaluation	
12.	Manual Interruptions Cleaning & sanitization after Each batch	-In appropriate Manual fixation of Hose pipes for cleaning -Spillage during Transfer of spent solution to CIP tank -Mishandling during Dismantling & fixation of components &	The Aseptic Processing environment get disturbed	7	5	4	=9 x 5 x 4=140	SOP for Seeding the material in Crystallizer Supervisory Control Separate Seeding Port
		accessories during cleaning						



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	\mathbf{P}_1	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Existing Design Control
				(S)	(P)	(D)		
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	
13.	Challenge Design for Pro	_	,				,	
13.1	Failure to simulate Process for 24 hrs	All the shifts may not be considered for Simulation study	Process simulation study will not be represent all the times for aseptic manufacturing	9	5	2	=9 x 5 x 2=90	All the shifts are considered in the Protocol
13.2	Aseptic Environment deterioration on employment of additional Man power in case of requirement	Inefficiency of HAVC system to withstand the disturbance by employing additional person for aseptic area manufacturing	Product contamination	9	5	7	=6 x 5 x 7=378	One additional Person is considered for Simulation study Gowning Procedure During Entry & exit HVAC Performance Study in Trial Batch
13.3	Aseptic Environment deterioration on performing minor maintenance work in the aseptic manufacturing area	Inefficiency of HAVC system to withstand the disturbance by carrying out minor maintenance work in the aseptic manufacturing area	Product contamination	9	5	7	=9 x 9 x 7=378	Environmental parameters recording in each shift



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	What are the Consequences	Severity	Ь			Existing Design Control
				(S)	(P)	(D)	$RPN = S \times P \times D$	
	Risk Analysis						Risk Evaluation	
13.3	Challenge Design for Pro	cess simulation study						
13.4	Aseptic Environment	Non Working of HVAC						Power Will be tripped
	deterioration on Power	System	D 1					Deliberately during Media
	failure		Product contamination					Fill study for studying the
				9	5	7	=6 x 5 x 7=378	disturbance during
								simulation study
								HVAC Recovery Study in Trial Batch



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

REPORT FOR RISK ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION OF PROCESS SIMULATION STUDY

5.2.3 Risk Reduction or Mitigation

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation	1										
1.	Lack of Personnel Hygiene & Attitude	No Formal or Practical training for aseptic manufacturing Lack of Attitude Medically unfit for aseptic manufacturing	Training for Personnel Hygiene for all persons Personnel Monitoring Once a day Training on Positive attitude for working. Yearly Medical Examination	9	8	7	504	Personnel Hygiene Monitoring in each shift Half yearly Medical Examination Adoption of Personnel Hygiene verification through Checklist before entering to Sterile Manufacturing area	9	3	3	81



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation	n						,				
2.	No Defined Man Movement Procedures	No Defined Flow for Man Movement No Procedural Control In adequate Training for the Person's No supervisory Control No display for instructions	Approved Layouts for Man movement Training on SOP for Exit & exit , Do's & Don'ts in sterile plant One shift in charge per shift SOP Display	9	5	7	315	Lay out Display in the corridor describing proper flow of material, Man & Waste Movement Provision for the Video recording to check the various activity in controlled area Exhaustive training for the staff about Man movement Procedure	9	3	2	54



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation						1		1	Т		
3.	Inappropriate Cleaning, Sanitization or Disinfection of Rooms (walls, roofs& floor), Outer surfaces of Equipment, instruments, utility lines, other pipe work and Platforms	-Non Availability of standard procedure for cleaning, Disinfection or sanitization and procedure for cleaning or disinfectant solution Preparation -Personnel not Trained Inappropriate design - Excessive Height of roof - Inaccessible surfaces - No finishing in the roofs Walls & Floor surfaces Ineffective and non validated Cleaning agents, sanitizers or disinfectant	Approved SOPs Training for the Persons Validated & Effective Cleaning agents, sanitizers or disinfectant SOP for Building Management verification is done half yearly	8	8	7	448	Ladder design with -platform to get stand for cleaning & disinfection -Safety measures to prevent fall from height -Proper height to reach the inaccessible area - SOP for Building Management has to be revised to include special consideration for sterile facility, Monthly verification is done for the finishing of roof, walls & Floor surfaces and other area of sterile manufacturing facility	8	4	3	96



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S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority		Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
4.	Failure in the	-Non availability	Availability of									
	Raw Material	of Vendor	Vendor Approval									
	Procurement,	Approval	Procedure									
	Storage,	Procedure						Since the Existing design control				
	Testing &	-Non Availability	Availability &					keep the risk at acceptable level so				
	Approval	& Inappropriate	Inappropriate					no additional Design control is				
		design of Ware	design of Ware					required				
		house for good	house					required				
		storage										
		-Non Availability	Availability of	9	5	2	90		9	5	2	90
		of Approved	Approved testing									
		testing Methods	Methods									
		-Non Availability	Availability									
		Procedure for	Procedure for									
		Rejection &	Rejection &									
		Approval of Raw	Approval of Raw									
		material for use	material for use									
		material for use	material for use									



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
5.	Risk Mitigation Inappropriate Raw & Packing material Handling	No Define Procedure and Provision for - material Flow - good storage conditions - Material Dispensing - Accurate Weighing - Material Identification	Approved Layouts for Material movement SOP for the storage of Raw & Packing Material SOP for the Dispensing of Material SOP for the operation of Weighing Balances	7	7	4	196	Lay out Display in the corridor describing proper flow of material, Man & Waste Movement The SS racks are required for the storage finished good SS pellets are required for keeping the Raw & Packing material intact as per requirement for batch Processing Additional gowning procedure is required for RM & PM Dispensing and also provision to keep gowns Supervisory control at the time of RM& PM Dispensing	7	4	3	84



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation	-	<u>, </u>									
6.	Drain System	Non availability	The GMP Model									
	Failure	of GMP Model of the drains Non availability of Standard procedure for the disinfection and sanitization of the available drains Operator are not trained for the sanitization procedure of the drain	of drains are provided in the Plant Standard procedure for the disinfection and sanitization of the are available for drains Operators are trained for the sanitization procedures	7	4	2	56	Since the Existing design control keep the risk at acceptable level so no additional Design control is required	7	4	2	56



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability		2 4 2	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
7.	Risk Mitigation Inappropriate Handling of sterilized Material during carrying, storage or usage	Non Availability of standard procedure Non Availability of Required Provision Operator Not Trained	Availability of validated standard procedure Mobile LAF for carrying Sterilized material Garment Cubicles for storage of	9	5	4	180	Provision for the Video recording to check the various activity in controlled area Additional Supervisory Control Formal & Practical training to the operator to assess the Capability of Man and machine to maintain the sterility of sterilized material	9	3	3	81
			sterilized garments Formal training to the operator									



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
8.		essing Equipments	T									
8.1	Operational Failure of Equipment	Non Availability of standard procedure Operator Not Trained	Availability of validated standard procedure Formal training to the operator for the operation of all Processing equipment operator	9	5	4	180	Provision for Easy Accessibility and Display of the Standard Operating Procedure The Practical Training for the operation of All equipments in the sterile Plant Additional Supervisory Control	9	3	3	81



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
8.	Failure of Proce	essing Equipments										
8.2	Dissolution Vessel, Vessel Washing Solvents & Crystallizer	Break Down Electrical Failure Lose of filter integrity of Vent filter MOC Not Compatible	SOP for Equipment Operation SOP to check filter before and after the batch SS 316 L verified during Qualification through certification	7	8	5	280	The Process Handling during Breakdown & Electrical failure must be the Part of SOP for the operation of equipment Provision for the Video recording to check the various activity in controlled area	7	4	2	56



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Ь	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
8.	Risk Mitigation	essing Equipments										
8.3	Filter train -Product Line -Solvent Line -Buffer Line	Breakdown High Pressure of Solution to be Filtered Lose of filter integrity of filter Loosening of Clamp holdings MOC Not Compatible	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of filtration through different filter trains SS 316 L verified during Qualification through certification	9	5	4	180	The Process Handling during Breakdown & Electrical failure must be the Part of SOP for the operation of Filter Train The Practical Training for the operation Supervisory control during Clamp & line assembling	9	3	3	81



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
8.	Failure of Proce	essing Equipments										
8.4	PFE	Breakdown Electrical Failure Lose of filter integrity of Filter cloth Lose of filter integrity of Nitrogen filter Loosening of Clamp holdings used to fix Material & ML MOC Not Compatible	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of filtration through different filter trains Supervisory control during Clamp & line assembling SS 316 L verified during Qualification	9	5	4	180	The Process Handling during Breakdown & Electrical failure must be the Part of SOP for the operation of PFE Provision for the Video recording to check the various activity in controlled area The Practical Training for the operation	9	3	2	54



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Prohability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
8.	Failure of Proce	essing Equipments	T	Т	Т	ı	T					
8.5	Combi & Conveyer System	Rotating Motor Failure Lose of filter integrity of Mesh Inappropriate Mesh Size Breakdown Electrical Failure Loosening of Clamp holdings MOC Not Compatible	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of filtration through different filter trains Supervisory control during Clamp & line assembling SS 316 L verified during Qualification	9	5	4	180	The Process Handling during Breakdown & Electrical failure must be the Part of SOP for the operation of Combi & Conveyer System Provision for the Video recording to check the various activity in controlled area The Practical Training for the operation	9	4	2	72



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
8.	Failure of Proce	ssing Equipments										
8.6	Blender	Breakdown Electrical Failure Product exposure during Material charging & Unloading	SOP for Equipment Operation Formal training to the operator for the operation of blender					Provision for the Video recording to check the various activity in controlled area The Process Handling during Breakdown & Electrical failure must be the Part of SOP for the operation of Blender				
		Accident during Rotation Loosening of Clamp holdings to Powder Bin MOC Not Compatible	Railing guard as safety measure Supervisory control during Clamping the Powder Bin SS 316 L verified during Qualification through certification	9	5	4	180	The Practical Training for the operation	9	4	2	72



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
9.	Failure of Envir	conment Monitoring	Equipments									
9.1	HVAC System	Breakdown Electrical Failure Lose of integrity of HEPA filters Accident during Rotation Disturbed Differential Pressure Improper Cleaning of Pre & microbe Filters Cleaning of Return Risers	Formal training to the operator for the operation of HVAC SOP for DP Monitoring in each shift SOP for the cleaning of Filters & return riser Half yearly Qualification Procedure For HVAC System	9	5	4	180	SOP for The Process Handling during Breakdown & Electrical failure of HVAC System The Practical Training for the operation On line Particle counter Provision for Separate location for the cleaning of supply filters & return riser	9	4	2	72



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
9.	Failure of Envir	conment Monitoring		1			1		,	ı		
9.2		-Breakdown	SOP for Equipment Operation									
	Dynamic Pass Boxes	Electrical Failure -Lose of integrity of HEPA filters -Disturbed Differential Pressure. -Improper Cleaning of Pre Filters -Improper Door Closing or Opening -Interlock for Door opening not activated or working	Formal training to the operator for the operation of Dynamic Pass Boxes DP Monitoring during Operation is the instructional part of SOP for operation SOP for the cleaning of Filters Half yearly Qualification Procedure For Equipment	9	5	4	180	SOP for handling the operation during Electrical failure & Breakdown of Dynamic Pass Box The Practical Training for the operation Additional Supervisory Control Provision for the Video recording to check the various activity in controlled area	9	4	2	72



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}		Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
9.		conment Monitoring I										
9.3	Laminar Air	Breakdown	SOP for Equipment									
	Flow Units	Electrical Failure Lose of integrity of HEPA filters Disturbed Differential Pressure Improper Cleaning of Pre Filters	instructional part of SOP for operation	9	5	4	180	SOP for handling the operation during Electrical failure & Breakdown of Dynamic Pass Box The Practical Training for the operation Additional Supervisory Control Provision for the Video recording to check the various activity in controlled area	9	4	2	72



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
10.		pment For Sterilization a	•		1			,				
	Steam Heat	Breakdown	SOP for Equipment					The Process				
	& Dry Heat Sterilizer	Non availability of Utility at required parameters Like Nitrogen, Pneumatic air, Pure Steam etc Instrument Malfunctioning PLC Malfunctioning Inappropriate Load for sterilization Non availability of validated standard Procedure of Sterilization	Operation Interlocks & alarm configuration for utility requirements -Instrument Calibration -Equipment Qualification -Validated Load configuration SOP for sterilization process for SHS & DHS	9	5	4	180	Handling during Breakdown & Electrical failure must be the Part of SOP for the operation of Dry Heat Sterilizer & Steam Heat Sterilizer Qualification of PLC Instrument must be calibrated Quarterly Additional Supervisory Control	9	3	3	81



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
10.		pment For Sterilization										
	Steam Heat		Formal training to the					Practical Training				
	Sterilizer	Operator Not trained	operator for the operation					to the Operator				
	& Dry Heat		of SHS & DHS									
	Sterilizer	Lose of integrity of	DP Monitoring during									
		HEPA filters (DHS)	Operation is the instructional part of SOP for operation					Qualification Procedure For				
		Improper Cleaning of						HEPA filters Half				
		HEPA Filters	SOP for the cleaning of Filters	9	5	4	180	Yearly	9	3	3	81
		Alarms & Interlocks										
		Not working										
			Verification of Alarms &									
		MOC Not Compatible	Interlocks Is the part of Qualification									
		Non availability of										
		validated standard Procedure of										
		Sterilization										



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
11.	Failure of Simul	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,				T					
11.1	The Wrong Selection of Nutrient Media	Inadequate Knowledge of the person Performing selection for medium nutrient Regulatory guidelines not followed	Formal training for media fill selection Criteria SS 316 L is the MOC of Different Processing Equipment which is compatible to Lactose The MOC is verified During qualification of Equipments Referred Guidance must be mentioned in the protocol Approval Procedure from Experience & Qualified Management	7	4	3	84	Since the Existing design control keep the risk at acceptable level so no additional Design control is required	7	4	3	84



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	cisting Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk	Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Rick	Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D))(RP	N)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RI	PN)
	Risk Mitigation													
11.	Failure of Simul	<u>. </u>								T				
11.2	Wrong Process	The Person is not qualified	Formal Training &											
	design for	or trained for designing the	relevant Experience i											
	Simulation	Process for Simulation study	Assessed for Process											
	Study	The Process Simulation	design											
		study may not cover all the	Product List is a the											
		products	Part of Protocol											
		The Process Parameters are							G: 4 F:4:					
		not decided as per Process	Reference of process						Since the Existing					
		package	Package must be						design control keep					
		The Process manipulations	are mentioned in the		7 4	4 3		84	the risk at acceptable	7	,	4	3	84
		not studied and evaluated	protocol		' '	1 3		04	level so no	,		4	3	04
			The worst case scenar	.: .					additional Design					
		The worst case scenario is	is calculated through	10					control is required					
		not appropriately decided	Product Matrix											
		Incorporation of process ste												
		having inhibitory action on	0 1 111111 0 1	is										
		Microbial growth like use o	was all works als in a											
		solvents, acids, alkalis,	supports microbial											
		High/low temperature, High	growth											
		agitation etc												
		agnation etc												



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}		Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
11.	Failure of Simul	ation Study										
11.3	Wrong Calculation of Quantity of Nutrient Medium for the simulation study	The complete details of total qty. of Non sterile Raw material which gives complete load on the Filter train may not be calculated	Total quantity is considered as per batch size	7	6	4	168	Total Non Sterile Load Calculation for different Products Shall be the Part of Protocol Approval Procedure from Experience & Qualified Management	7	4	3	84
11.4	Wrong Calculation of Holding Time in the Equipment	The total time taken for the processing in a particular equipment is not ascertain correctly	Crystallizer time is considered for crystallizer Drying time for PFE	7	6	4	168	Total Holding time Calculation for different Products Shall be the Part of Protocol Approval Procedure from Experience & Qualified Management	7	4	3	84



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}		Existing Design Control	Severity	(d) Probability	(d) Detection	CAB Risk Priority Number		Severity	(d) Probability	(D) Detection	RI(RI	
44	Risk Mitigation		<u>'</u>				<u>'</u>	,					
11.	Failure of Simul	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	1		1	1		,	-				
11.5	Wrong agitation Time	Process is not studied for agitation requirement so as to prevent microbial inhibition	Minimum Agitation is Considered in crystallizer & PFE	7	5	4	140	Total Agitation time Calculation for different Products Shall be the Par of Protocol Approval Procedure from Experience & Qualified		7	4	3	84



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
11.6	Failure of Simula							T	1			
11.6	Wrong In process	_	Trained & Qualified									
	Sampling & Final	1	persons for sampling									
	Sampling	Non Availability of SOPs for cleaning & up keep of sampling tools Standard operating procedure may not be in place Sampling time for in process may not be studied or established Sampling frequency for in process may not be studied or established	Sampling time is fixed Protocols define the	7	5	4	140	Additional Supervisory Control Practical Training	7	4	3	84



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failu	re Existing Design Control		Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
					(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)	A D	(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation												
11.6	Failure of Simul	<u> </u>		•								-	
11.7	Testing Failure	of Standard testing sterility Method -Non Availability of Validated Analytical Method -Analyst Not trained -Expired Reagents Poor membrane filter	Wrong Analysis -Faulty results -Regulatory non compliance Non Representative Sampling -Faulty analytical results Poor Performance of Analytical Instrument	7	4	3		84	Since the Existing design control keep the risk at acceptable level so no additional Design control is required	7	4	3	84



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
	D. 1. 2511			(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
12.	Manual Interruption	ons										
12.1	Disturbance of		SOP for Seeding the									
	aseptic		material in Crystallizer					E 10D / 1				
	environment in	Operator error-		7	5	4	140	Formal &Practical	7	3	4	84
	the crystallizer		Supervisory Control for					Training				
	because of seeding		the same Separate Seeding Port					For seeding				
12.2	Product exposure		SOP for the Operation					1 or seeding				
	during transfer of	Malfunctioning of	Formal training for the									
	material from	Clamp used to fix	same	7	5	4	140	Formal &Practical	7	3	4	84
	PFE to Combi	Bellow	Supervisory Control	/	3	4	140	Training	/	3	4	04
			Mobile LAF for fixing									
	through Conveyer	Operator Error	the Bellow to the									
			convever									



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

12.3	Product exposure	Malfunctioning of	SOP for the Operation									
	during Blending	Clamp used to fix	Formal training for the									
	& Packing	Bellow	same									
		Operator Error	Supervisory Control Mobile LAF & Vertical LAF for fixing the Powder Bin to Blender & performing Packing respectively	7	5	4	140	Formal &Practical Training	7	3	4	84



QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT

S.No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
13.		for Process simulation stud				1	1		1			
13.1	Failure to	All the shifts may not be	All the shifts are	0	_			Risk Is under		_	_	
	simulate Process	considered for Simulation	considered in the	9	5	2	90	Acceptance Criteria	9	5	2	90
	for 24 hrs	study	Protocol									
13.2	Aseptic		One additional					Personnel Monitoring				
	Environment	Inefficiency of HAVC	Person is					In Each shift				
	deterioration on	system to withstand the	considered for					Environmental				
	employment of	disturbance by employing	Simulation study	9	5	7	378	Monitoring In each	9	4	2	72
	additional Man	additional person for						Shift				
	power in case of	aseptic area manufacturing	Gowning Procedure					Online Particular				
	requirement		During Entry & exit					counter				
13.3	Aseptic	Inefficiency of HAVC	HVAC					Environmental				
13.3	Environment	system to withstand the	Performance Study					parameters recording				
	deterioration on	disturbance by carrying	in Trail Batch					in each shift hourly				
	performing minor							interval				
	maintenance worl			9	5	7	378	Provision for the	9	4	2	72
	in the aseptic	manufacturing area						Video recording to				
	manufacturing	manuracturing area						check the various				
								activity in controlled				
	area							area				



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S. No.	Failure Mode {What can go wrong}	Potential cause of Failure	Existing Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number	Additional Design Control	Severity	Probability	Detection	Risk Priority Number
				(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)		(S)	(P)	(D)	(RPN)
	Risk Mitigation											
13.	Challenge Design 1	for Process simulation s	study									
13.4	Aseptic	Non Working of	Power Will be					SOP for Process Handling				
	Environment	HVAC System	tripped					during Power Failure				
	deterioration on Power failure		Deliberately during Media Fill study for studying the disturbance level HVAC Recovery Study in Trail Batch	9	5	7	378	Environmental Monitoring In each Shift Online Particular counter Environmental parameters recording in each shift hourly interval	9	4	2	72



REPORT FOR RISK ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION OF PROCESS SIMULATION STUDY

6. Acceptance criteria

The Risk Priority Number shall be within the range 0<RPN<100.

7. Risk Control Strategy

S.No.	Risk Priority Number	Risk Decision	Risk control strategy
1.	0 <rpn<100< td=""><td>Risk Acceptable</td><td>No control is required</td></rpn<100<>	Risk Acceptable	No control is required
2.	100 <rpn<500< td=""><td>Risk Reduction</td><td>Additional Procedural Control</td></rpn<500<>	Risk Reduction	Additional Procedural Control
			Manual Control
			Documentary Evidence
3.	500 <rpn<1000< td=""><td>Risk Reduction</td><td>Rugged Procedural control</td></rpn<1000<>	Risk Reduction	Rugged Procedural control
			Additional Manual Control
			Auditing
			Engineering controls (if Possible)

8. Summary and Conclusion

The risk associated with each Failure mode lies in between the range 0<RPN<100 after going through risk mitigation and reduction process

Hence it meets the acceptance criteria for risk acceptance

On the basis of Risk assessment process using FMEA tool it is concluded that the Process Simulation Study is associated with an acceptable level of risk and there is no any adverse impact of on carrying out the simulation study under the given set up of manufacturing facility and process design strategy.

9. References:

- 1. Risk Management Master Plan
- **2.** ICH Q9